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In this paper, we explore the structure and implications of interbank networks in 
prewar Japan, focusing on director interlocking. We find that approximately half the 
banks had at least one connection with another bank through director interlocking, and 
that a bank that had connections with other banks was less likely to fail than a bank 
without a network. The quality of networks also matters in the sense that the failure 
probability of a bank with a network was negatively associated with the profitability of 
the connected banks. On the other hand, there is no strong evidence of financial 
contagion through networks. In addition, networks of director interlocking contributed 
to the stabilization of the financial system through coordinating bank mergers. 
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1. Introduction 
Social network analysis has been developing in the fields of sociology and 
mathematics for the past 50 years. Meanwhile, in the field of economics, the number of 
studies on networks has surged over the past decade. Some of these studies use game 
theoretical models to investigate how networks form when a person strategically 
constructs links with others, and how stable and efficient such networks are (Jackson 
2003, 2006; Goyal 2007). Other studies have applied network analysis to investigate 
economic phenomena such as mutual insurance among villagers (Fafchamps and Gubert 
2007), informal credit among firms (Macmillan and Woodruff 1999), and welfare 
participation (Bertland et al. 2000). These studies focus on the effects of networks on 
economic behavior and outcomes. 
In recent years, social networks through boards of directors have attracted 
attention in various research fields, e.g., statistical physics, economics, sociology and 
management, among others1. In particular, current research in financial economics 
investigates how director interlocking affects the firm performance or the effectiveness 
of monitoring by the board. Some studies hypothesize that directors serving on multiple 
boards are too busy to perform their monitoring roles effectively, and find supporting 
empirical evidence that reveals that firms with interlocking directors are associated 
with lower performance, lower sensitivity of COE turnover to firm performance and 
negative evaluation from stock markets (Fich and Shivdasani 2006, Non and Franses 
2007, Devos et al. 2009, and Croci and Grassi 2010). Furthermore, other studies find 
                                                 
1  Research in the field of statistical physics and computational organization science 
captures quantitatively the structure of networks through interlocking directors. There, 
it is generally observed that these networks are assortative, highly clustered, and 
dominated by a giant component and small worlds (Davis et al. 2003; Battiston and 
Catanzaro 2004; Robins and Alexander 2004; Conyon and Muldoon 2006; Milakovic et al. 
2010). 3 
that firms with interlocked boards are likely to award higher compensation (Hallock 
1997; Barnea and Guedj 2006). 
On the other hand, director interlocking may facilitate sharing and transmitting 
useful information about business practices and strategies, and if this is the case, 
director interlocking can be beneficial to firms2. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
Loderer and Peyer (2002) and Perry and Peyer (2005) obtained empirical evidence that 
director interlocks positively affect firm value3. In addition, some recent studies examine 
directly whether financial practices are transferred through board interlocking, and find 
that networks through board interlocks affected the adoption of poison pills (Davis 1991). 
Some studies also find that such networks contributed to the spread of the practice of 
backdating stock option grants to their executives (Bizjak et al. 2009), and increased the 
likelihood of being the target of a private equity (PE)-based take-private transaction 
(Stuart and Yim 2010). 
Meanwhile, in the literature on money and banking, recent theoretical research 
investigates how a shock to one bank spreads contagiously to other banks, and how the 
possibility of contagion is associated with the structure of interbank networks (Allen and 
Gale 2000; Freixas et al. 2000; Dasgupta 2004; Leinter 2005; Brusco and Castiglionesi 
2007; Gai and Kapadia 2010)4. Based on these theoretical frameworks, several empirical 
                                                 
2Based on resource dependence theory, Preffer and Salanik (1978) suggest that 
interlocking boards can play a role in facilitating communication and buffering the effect 
of environmental uncertainty. In addition, there are numerous studies in the field of 
management that show that corporate strategies or business practices can be 
transferred between firms through the networks of director interlocking (Palmer et al. 
1993; Haunschild 1993; Westphal and Zajac 1997; Rao and Sivakumar 1999; etc.). 
3  Perry and Peyer document that interlocks raise firm value when executives are 
appointed in financial, high-growth, or related-industry firms. Loderer and Peyer (2002) 
show that the number of board seats in listed firms held by the chairman of a firm 
positively affects the value of the firm based on the Swiss data. In addition, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue that the number of directorships can be a signal of directors’ 
competence. In this case also, director interlocking can raise firm value. 
4 See Allen and Babus (2009) for a comprehensive survey. 4 
studies have simulated the possibility of financial contagion (Sheldom and Maurer 1998; 
Furine 2003; Upper and Worms 2004; Degryse and Ngyuen 2007). Recent empirical 
literature also analyzes financial contagion through interbank loan networks, using the 
actual event of the bank failure. Iyer and Peydro (2010), for example, find evidence that 
banks with higher exposures to the failed bank in the interbank market experienced 
larger deposit withdrawals, using the failure of a large cooperative bank in India5. 
In this paper, we explore the structure and implications of interbank networks 
through director interlocking in Japan before the Second World War. Prewar Japan has 
a number of attractive features for the empirical study of corporate networks. First, 
there were indeed many corporate networks, in particular networks among banks. Many 
large investors held blocks of shares in and directorships of multiple banks, and as a 
result, banks connected with other banks through director interlocking and ownership 
to form networks (Okazaki et al. 2005, 2007). Second, rich relevant data are available. 
From company directories, we can compile a comprehensive database of directors to 
identify interbank networks through director interlocking. In addition, comprehensive 
financial data on banks are available from the official publications of the Ministry of 
Finance. Third, in that period, the Japanese financial system experienced financial 
crises and a wave of bank mergers and exits. These events provide us with a good 
opportunity to examine the implications of interbank networks for stability/instability of 
the financial system. 
Using a newly compiled data set, we investigate how a network affected bank 
survivability, taking into account its quality and structure, whether a network promoted 
bank consolidations, and how it affected post-merger performance. In addition, we 
examine the possibility of financial contagion through the network of interlocking 
                                                 
5 In addition, Carson et al. (2010) showed that the failures of large banks increased the 
probability of failures of other banks through correspondent relationships. 5 
boards 6. Thus, we test whether withdrawals of deposits spread through director 
networks, using the data of the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, when a nationwide bank 
run occurred. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
characteristics of interbank networks based on director interlocking in prewar Japan. 
Section 3 examines the effects of interbank networks on the survivability of banks. In 
Section 4, we investigate the effects of the interbank networks on financial contagion. In 
Section 5, we analyze how an interbank network affected the choice of counterpart 
banks in consolidations, and examine how consolidations based on interbank networks 
differed from the other consolidations in terms of post-merger performance. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Structure and Quality of Networks 
As stated above, in prewar Japan, many large investors held blocks of shares in, 
and directorships of, multiple banks, and as a result, there were many interbank 
networks through director interlocking and ownership. Because of limitations of 
ownership data, we identify interbank networks by focusing on director interlocking. 
The data sources are the 1926 and 1931 issues of the Directory of Banks and Companies 
(Ginko Kaisha Youroku) produced by a major private credit bureau, Tokyo Koshinjo7. 
                                                 
6  Interbank networks based on director interlocking may constitute a channel of 
financial contagion. At the same time, however, networks among banks may enhance 
the durability of banks, as did the shift from unit banking to branch banking (Calomiris 
1990). 
7 The Directory of Banks and Companies was used by Okazaki et al. (2005). Tokyo 
Koshinjo, one of the largest private credit bureaus in prewar Japan, published a 
directory of corporate directors, Ginko Kaisha Youroku, every year from 1897 to 1942. 6 
The Directory of Banks and Companies covers directors and auditors of the banks 
and nonbanking firms whose paid-in capital was not less than 200,000 yen8. We selected 
the year 1926 for analysis because thereafter the financial system became unstable and 
a huge wave of bank mergers and exits took place (Okazaki and Sawada 2007; Okazaki 
et al. 2007)9. Hence, we can observe the role of interbank networks under the unstable 
financial system. In addition, we selected the year 1931 to see the effect of interbank 
networks on bank performance during a normal period. After the Showa Depression of 
193031, the Japanese economy recovered quickly and was not exposed to large negative 
shocks. 
The financial data of each bank for 1926 and 1931 are taken from the 1927 and 
1932 issues of the Yearbook of the Bank Bureau (Ginkokyoku Nenpo) published by the 
Ministry of Finance, which covers all the banks in Japan, excluding its colonies. The 
number of banks commonly included in these two sources is 1,007 for 1926 and 597 for 
193110. 
By using the Directory of Banks and Companies, we identify that a given pair of 
banks had a connection if a person served concurrently as a director of both banks. Even 
if a certain bank (Bank A) had two directors who also held directorships in the other 
bank (Bank B), the number of connections between Bank A and Bank B is counted as 
one.   Our measure of interbank networks—relationships through director 
interlocking—is designed to capture not just human relationships but also broader 
                                                 
8 Conveniently, this source includes a name index. This index lists all the banks and 
nonbanking companies in which named individuals had directorships. 
9 The Bank Law set banks’ minimum capital requirements, which many banks were 
unable to meet. Those banks were practically obliged to merge with another bank or face 
liquidation. We discuss this law in more detail in Section 5. 
10 Ginkokyoku Nenpo covers 1,417 (683) ordinary banks in Japan, excluding its colonies, 
as at the end of 1926 (1931). Complete financial data are available for 1,398 (636) of the 
1,417 (683) banks. Data on directors and auditors are available from Ginko Kaisha 
Youroku for 1,007 (597) banks. 7 
aspects of relationships among the relevant banks, namely, ownership, interbank loans, 
and correspondence relationships. Imuta (1980) pointed out that directorship 
connections represented deeper relationships than did correspondent and interbank 
loan relationships. 
This point is illustrated by the following two cases where detailed information on 
financial transactions is available. First, Imuta (1980) shows the correspondent 
relationships of Oshi Shogyo Bank prevailing at the end of 1930. Oshi Shogyo Bank, the 
third-largest bank in Saitama Prefecture at the time, had correspondent agreements 
with 656 headquarters and branches of 116 private banks. Out of the 656 agreements, 
20 were with the headquarters and branches of Ashikaga Bank, and this number of 
agreements  was the third largest, except for the four zaibatsu  banks, which had 
nationwide branch networks and were major correspondents of many banks. Meanwhile, 
Oshi Shogyo Bank only had director interlocking with Ashikaga Bank in 1930. These 
facts suggest that director interlocking was associated with correspondent relationships 
between the two banks. 
Second, as for interbank loan relationships, we look at the case of 
Daihyakusanjusan Bank, the second-largest bank in Shiga Prefecture in 1926. Detailed 
accounting records for Daihyakusanjusan Bank are held at the Archival Museum of the 
Faculty of Economics, Shiga University. A series of accounting records entitled Taten 
Kanjo Motocho (Ledger on Branches of Other Banks) provides information about the 
account balances between Daihyakusanjusan Bank and the branches of other banks. At 
the end of 1926, Daihyakusanjusan Bank was in a net borrowing position with 74 banks, 
and its total net borrowing amounted to 618,180 yen. At the same time, it had a net 
lending position with 19 banks, and its total net lending amounted to 8,866 yen. It is 
significant that the largest contribution to its net borrowing, 275,768 yen, was from 
Yamaguchi Bank, which was the only bank with which Daihyakusanjusan Bank had 8 
director interlocking. This fact suggests that director interlocking was associated with 
interbank loans. In summary, these two cases suggest that our measure of interbank 
networks, director interlocking, is significant for capturing interbank financial 
relationships. Hence, we use this measure in the analysis of financial contagion in 
Section 4. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the numbers of connections that individual 
banks had in 1926 and 1931. As shown in this table, 587 of 1,007 banks (58.3%) had at 
least one connection with another bank through director interlocking in 1926 (Panel A), 
as did 271 of 597 banks (45.4%) in 1931 (Panel B). The number of connections in Table 1 
corresponds to the “degree” concept from the social network analysis literature. In this 
literature, the degree, i.e., the number of relations a certain node has with other nodes, 
is supposed to be a measure of the “centrality” of the former node in the network. That is, 
the more relations a node has with other nodes within a network, the more central or 
important in the network that node is considered to be (Wasserman and Faust 1994; 
Jackson 2008; etc.). 
In Table 2, we examine the structure of the director interlocking networks in more 
detail with respect to banks with at least one degree (587 banks in 1926 and 271 banks 
in 1931). First, to have an overview of the structure network, we divide them into 
components, in the sense of the graph theory. A component is defined as a subgraph 
where all pairs of nodes in it are reachable through their connections. We counted the 
number of components for 1926 and 1931, and found there were 137 and 75 components 
in 1926 and 1931, respectively. Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution of the size of 
components (the number of nodes in each component). Most of the components consisted 
of 24 nodes (banks) in both 1926 and 1931, which suggests that the network of director 
interlocking in prewar Japanese banking industry was characterized by numerous 
small-sized subnetworks. This observation is in contrast with preceding literature on 9 
the network structure of director interlocking, which mostly reports that the network of 
director interlocking is dominated by a giant component (Battiston and Catanzaro 2004, 
Brrokfiel 2009, Milakovic et al. 2010, among others). 
In Panel B, we calculate various network measures in addition to “degree,” that is, 
“clustering coefficient,” “core degree,” “average nearest neighbor degree,” and 
“assortativity coefficient” 11 . “Clustering coefficient” is a measure of density of 
connections around a node12. That is, it represents the ratio of the number of links 
(connections) in the neighborhood (adjacent nodes) of a node to the number of links 
(connections) if the neighborhood was completely connected13. Panel B shows that the 
clustering coefficient is 0.24 in 1926 and 0.19 in 1931. Those values are not as high as 
those found in other research on director interlocking (Battiston and Catanzaro 2004; 
Brrokfiel 2009), probably because the network structure of prewar Japan was composed 
of small-sized subnetworks, as shown in Panel A. 
“Core degree” indicates the extent to which a bank belongs to a high-density 
subnetwork (subgraph). Generally, k-core is a subnetwork in which each node has at 
least k links (connections) in the same subnetwork (subgraph). The number of k is called 
the core degree. Panel B reports that the value of the core degree is around 1.5. This 
result is also likely to reflect that there were many subnetworks composed of only two 
banks. In summary, the network structure of director interlocking was not highly dense 
as a whole. 
                                                 
11 There are two well-known measures of “centrality” in addition to degree centrality, 
namely, “closeness” and “betweenness.” We do not use these measures because the 
network in this study is composed of numerous different-sized subnetworks, as shown in 
Panel A of Table 2. It is difficult to evaluate the centrality of nodes belonging to 
different-sized subnetworks by using these measures. 
12 See Appendix 1 for the mathematical definition of the clustering coefficient. 
13 The clustering coefficient cannot be defined for nodes with one degree. Therefore, we 
treated the value of the clustering coefficient of such nodes as zero. 10 
“Assortativity coefficient” is the Pearson correlation coefficient of degrees of node 
linked to each other, which measures the properties of assortative mixing or 
disassortative mixing14. The former is the property that nodes with high degree are more 
likely to form connections with nodes with high degree, and the latter is that nodes with 
high degree are more likely to form connections with nodes with low degree. In Panel B, 
we can confirm the positive values of  assortativity coefficient in both 1926 and 1931, 
which indicates assortative mixing. Namely, banks with high degree are more likely to 
be connected with banks with high degree. Furthermore, we also check the property of 
assortative mixing, or not, as the case may be, using a measure of “Average nearest 
neighbor degree,” defined as 
 
'
) | ' ( ' ) (
k
nn k k P k k K . (1) 
P(k’|k) represents the probability that a neighbor node (adjacent node) of a node with 
degree k has degree k. When Knn(k) increases (decreases) with k, the property of a 
network is assortative (disassortative). Figure 1 shows the plots of Knn(k) for both of the 
networks for years 1926 and 1931, and confirms that both of them have a tendency to 
increase with k, which suggests that the network of director interlocking in prewar 
Japan was assortative. These results are consistent with other studies on the network 
structure of director interlocking, which generally report assortative mixing of their 
networks (Battiston and Catanzaro 2004; Conyon and Muldoon 2006)15. In Panel B of 
Table 2, we show the average nearest neighbor degree with respect to individual banks, 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 1 for the mathematical definition of the degree correlation. 
15   Newman (2001) investigates various networks and finds that social networks 
generally have a property of assortative mixing, while technological and biological 
networks have a property of disassortative mixing. 11 
namely, the average of the number of connections for all adjacent banks to a bank16. We 
use this measure in the analyses below. 
To illustrate the regional characteristics of interbank networks, in Panel C we 
classify banks with connections based on another criterion. A bank with an 
“intraregional network” is one connected only with banks operating in the same 
prefecture17. By contrast, a bank with an “interregional network” is a bank with at least 
one connection with a bank whose headquarters were located in a different prefecture. 
Panel C indicates that about 70% of banks were part of an intraregional network in both 
1926 and 1931. Thus, the networks of director interlocking were mainly formed within 
prefectures. 
Table 3 reports basic statistics on the financial performance of banks both within 
and outside networks. A comparison of these two types of banks reveals that large banks 
had a tendency to have connections with other banks. Further, banks within networks 
were more profitable and more liquid than banks outside networks. This might reflect 
the fact that larger banks were more profitable than smaller ones in prewar Japan 
(Okazaki et al. 2005; etc.). 
It is noteworthy that our data allow us to measure the quality of bank networks. 
We measure the quality of the network of a bank, Bank A, for instance, by the average 
performance of the banks with which Bank A was connected. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of the quality of the networks for the 587 connected banks in 1926 and the 
271 connected banks in 1931, respectively. Network quality varies substantially, in 
                                                 
16 This measure was also used in Imakubo and Soejima (2010) to examine the property 
of affinity in Japan’s interbank money market. They regressed the average nearest 
neighbor degree of each bank on its degree and found a negative correlation, which 
indicates disassortative mixing. We conducted the same test, and confirmed a positive 
correlation, which suggested assortative mixing. 
17 Operating in the same prefecture means that the headquarters of both banks were in 
the same prefecture. 12 
terms of all financial ratios. In other words, there was substantial heterogeneity in the 
quality of networks. This fact is significant when considering the implications of 
interbank networks. For example, a bank connected with banks that were performing 
well might expect support in times of emergency, and might also expect to share useful 
information and knowledge. By contrast, a bank connected with banks that were 
performing badly might be adversely affected as a result. This issue is addressed in the 
next section. 
 
3. Networks and Bank Performance 
3.1. The Effects of Networks on Survivability 
As revealed in the previous section, many banks formed networks through director 
interlocking in prewar Japan. In this section, we examine how those networks affected 
bank performance and, thereby, the stability/instability of the financial system. During 
the 1920s and 1930s, there were many bank failures in Japan because of a sequence of 
financial crises such as the Showa Financial Crisis (1927) and the Showa 
Depression(19301931). Thus, we explore the relationship between interbank networks 
and the probability of bank failure. To this end, we construct panel data composed of two 
sets of cross-sectional data. The first data set (the group for 1926) is the one that relates 
the interbank network of 1926 to the probability of bank failures between 1927 and 1931. 
The second data set (the group for 1931) is the one that relates the interbank network of 
1931 to the probability of bank failures between 1932 and 1936. 
Using this panel data, we estimate the following probit equation for bank i in year 
t (t=26, 31). 
Pr(FAILit = 1) = F(0 + 1*NETWORKit + 2*EQit + 3*SIZEit + 4*BOJit + 5*MSit)  (2) 13 
FAILit is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if a bank exited because of failure 
in the following five years, namely between 1927 and 1931 in the case of 1926 and 
between 1932 and 1936 in the case of 1931, and zero otherwise18. As for the explanatory 
variables, NETWORK is the network variable to capture the effect of interbank 
networks. In the estimation, we use two alternative sets of variables for NETWORK, 
namely NT and N_CONNECTION. NT is a dummy variable that equals unity if bank i 
had at least one connection with another bank, and zero otherwise. N_CONNECTION 
represents the number of connections. This is to capture the effect of the scale of a 
network. An interbank network may affect the survivability of a bank in various ways. 
First, a bank with a network may receive relief loans from its connected banks in the 
event of an emergency19. Second, a bank with a network may be able to share 
information and useful knowledge, or monitor business relationships that enhance its 
survivability (Preffer and Salanik 1978; Loderer and Peyer 2002). Hence, in equation (2), 
the expected sign of the coefficients of NT and N_CONNECTION is negative. 
A number of control variables are included in equation (2), following Okazaki et al. 
(2007) and Okazaki (2007), who investigated the determinants and implications of bank 
exits in prewar Japan20. EQ is used to control for the effect of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake of 1923. Many banks in the South Kanto District (comprising Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama Prefectures) experienced serious bad-loan problems 
                                                 
18 The definition of a failure in the analysis is an exit due to reasons other than a merger, 
following Okazaki (2007) and Okazaki et al. (2007). 
19  Imuta (1980) cites the history of the Shikoku bank, and points out that banks 
belonging to large networks may have benefited from efficient asset portfolio allocation 
because they expected to be able to obtain relief loans in times of emergency from banks 
in their networks. 
20 Since the work of Okazaki et al. (2007), and particularly because of their focus on the 
effects of connections between banks and nonbanking companies, it has been standard 
practice to include variables relating to these connections in empirical models. In this 
paper, the model replaces this variable with one designed to capture the effect of 
interbank networks. 14 
because of the collateral destruction caused by the earthquake. EQ is a dummy variable 
that is unity if the bank’s headquarters was located in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, or 
Saitama Prefectures, and zero otherwise. We expect banks operating in those 
prefectures to have had higher failure rates. Hence, the coefficient of EQ is expected to 
be positive. SIZE is defined as the log of total assets21. It is likely that large banks can 
more easily diversify their assets, and are better able to endure negative shocks. Hence, 
the coefficient of SIZE is expected to be negative. The variable BOJ is a dummy variable 
that equals unity if a bank had a transaction relationship with the Bank of Japan (BOJ), 
and zero otherwise. Okazaki (2007) investigated the role of the Lender of Last Resort 
(LLR) in prewar Japan and found that having a transaction relationship with the BOJ 
lowered the probability of failure for solvent banks. Hence, the variable BOJ is included 
to capture the effect of LLR loans. MS denotes the market share of the top three banks in 
a prefecture in terms of the number of operating units (i.e., the headquarters and 
branches in the prefecture)22. Because banks in competitive markets are more likely to 
fail than those in less competitive markets, the coefficient of MS is expected to be 
negative. 
In addition to these control variables, we add several financial ratios of banks. 
These include the return on equity (ROE), the ratio of capital to deposits (CAPDEPO), 
the ratio of bank deposit reserves to total assets (LIQUID), and the ratio of security 
holdings to loans (SECURITY), following Okazaki et al. (2007) and Okazaki (2007). 
These variables were chosen primarily to capture the components of the CAMEL rating, 
which has become a standard indicator of the risk of bank failure (Wheelock and Wilson 
2000). CAPDEPO is used to capture the capital adequacy of a bank. A low value for this 
                                                 
21 Total assets are the sum of total capital and total deposits. 
22 This variable is common for all banks in the same prefecture. Because data on the 
amounts of deposits or loans of individual banks by prefecture are not available, we used 
the number of branch offices to represent market share. 15 
variable indicates a high risk. LIQUID is used to capture the liquidity of assets. If a 
bank has sufficient liquid assets, it is likely to survive an abrupt withdrawal of deposits. 
An increase in ROE is expected to reduce the probability of bank failure. Note that the 
profit data on individual banks used to measure ROE are censored at zero by our source 
(Ginkokyoku Nenpo). That is, bank losses (negative profits) are not reported by this 
source23. Then, in the following analyses, the values of ROE in those banks are treated 
as zero. SECURITY is used to capture the risk associated with asset portfolios. In 
existing studies of the banking industry in prewar Japan, securities are treated as 
relatively safe assets with lower risks. This is because these securities comprise mainly 
government bonds and corporate bonds issued by major companies (Nanjo and Kauya 
2006). Hence, we expect the coefficient of SECURITY to be negative. With respect to all 
explanatory variables, the values of the end of 1926 and 1931 are used in the cases for 
the 1926 and 1931 groups, respectively. In addition, the dummy variable for the group of 
the relevant year is included in the estimation. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of equation (2). In columns 1 and 2, we use 
NT as a network variable. In column 1, the coefficient of NT is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, which suggests that banks within networks were less likely 
to fail than those outside networks. Hence, interbank networks through director 
interlocking had a positive effect on survivability of banks. The coefficients of SIZE, EQ, 
and MS are statistically significant and have the expected signs. Thus, smaller banks in 
more competitive markets or those in areas damaged by the Great Kanto Earthquake in 
1923 were more likely to fail. This finding is consistent with those of Okazaki et al. 
(2007) and Okazaki (2007). In column 2, the financial ratio variables are added. We can 
confirm that ROE has an especially strong effect: the coefficient of ROE is negative and 
                                                 
23 The percentage of banks with censored observations is 10.4. 16 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that profitable banks were less 
likely to exit because of failure. After controlling for the financial ratios, the coefficient of 
NT remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is 
inconsistent with a series of studies that suggest that board interlocks negatively 
affected firm value (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Non and Franses 2007; Devos et al. 2009; 
Croci and Grassi 2010; etc.). One interpretation of the above estimation results is that a 
bank connected with banks that were performing well could expect support in times of 
emergency, or could expect to share useful information and knowledge or to monitor 
business relationships (Preffer and Salanik 1978; Loderer and Peyer 2002). 
In columns 3, we use the number of connections (N_CONNECTION) as a network 
variable. In column 3, the coefficient of N_CONNECTION is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, which suggests that the more connections a bank had with 
other banks, the less likely it was to fail. The variable N_CONNECTION corresponds to 
“degree centrality” in network measures. Therefore, this result is completely different 
from that of Croci and Grassi (2010), who find that network centrality negatively affects 
firm performance, using data on Italian firms. Furthermore, in column 4, we replace it 
with the four dummy variables indicating the number of connections, considering the 
nonlinear effect of the network. For instance, Dummy [N_CONNECTION=1] takes a 
value of unity if a bank had one connection with another bank, and zero otherwise. It can 
be confirmed in column 4 that all dummy variables have negative coefficients, and that 
the negative effects are statistically significant when banks have either one connection 
or four or more connections. Therefore, the effect of the network on bank survivability is 
not a simple linear relation. On the other hand, the banks with four or more connections 
were less likely to fail, which implies that banks with high centrality enjoyed 
substantial benefits from the network. Therefore, it is worth examining the effect of 
network structure on bank survivability in more detail. We will consider this point later. 17 
3.2. Endogeneity of Interbank Networks 
In the preceding analysis, network variables were treated as exogenous. However, 
we cannot a priori deny the possibility that interbank networks were formed 
endogenously. For example, a bank may want to form networking links with a bank that 
is performing well because the former expects the latter to bring future benefits. If so, a 
bank that is performing well has more chance of having networks with other banks, 
which makes network variables endogenous. Hence, to control for the potential 
endogeneity of interbank networks, we consider the following equation, which includes 
two instrumental variables for the network variable NETWORK: 
NETWORKit = 0 + 1*N_BANKit + 2*N_DIRECTORit + Xit + it ,   (3) 
where the dependent variable NETWORK denotes the network variables. The 
explanatory variable N_BANK denotes the total number of banks in the prefecture 
where a bank operated. We employ this variable as an instrument for the network 
variable. This is justifiable because, as shown in Panel C of Table 2, interbank networks 
developed mainly within the same prefecture and, hence, a bank in the prefecture where 
there were many banks was more likely to have a connection with another bank. Hence, 
the coefficient of N_BANKi is expected to be positive. N_DIRECTOR is the number of 
directors working for the bank in 1926 or 1931. Because our measure of networking is 
director interlocking, the more directors a bank had, the more likely it was for that bank 
to have had a network with other banks. Hence, the coefficient of N_DIRECTORi is 
expected to be positive24. X represents a vector of exogenous variables. When NT is used 
                                                 
24  The literature on corporate governance shows that the number of directors is 
correlated with firm performance. For example, Yermack (1996) showed that firms with 
fewer directors had higher stock market valuations. If the number of bank directors in 
1926 was correlated with the ex ante performance of banks (as measured by, say, 
financial performance or market valuation in 1926), we cannot deny the possibility of a 18 
as NETWORK, we estimate equation (3) as a bivariate probit model because NT is a 
binary variable25. That is, we estimate equations (2) and (3) simultaneously. On the 
other hand, when N_CONNECTION is used as NETWORK, we estimate both equations 
with a two-stage least squares method (Newey 1987). The estimation results of 
equations (2) and (3) are presented in columns 1, 3, and 5 and in columns 2, 4, and 6 of 
Table 5, respectively. In column 1 (Model 1), as before, the coefficient of NT is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, even after controlling for the endogeneity of 
interbank networks. In column 2 (Model 1), both instrumental variables (N_BANK and 
N_DIRECTOR) have the expected signs and statistically significant effects. In columns 
3 and 4 (Model 2), where financial ratios are included as explanatory variables, the 
coefficient of NT is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, we have 
strong evidence that interbank networks had a positive effect on bank survivability, 
even after controlling for the endogeneity of interbank networks. In columns 5 and 6 
(Model 3), where the number of connections (N_CONNECTION) is used as an 
endogenous variable, the coefficient of N_CONNECTION is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In summary, having controlled for the endogeneity of 
interbank networking, we obtained robust evidence that interbank networking through 
director interlocking had a positive effect on bank survivability. 
                                                                                                                                               
correlation between the number of bank directors in 1926 (1931) and the ex post 
performance of banks, namely, the probability of bank failure between 1927 and 1931 
(1932 and 1936). Therefore, we checked whether the number of directors in 1926 (1931) 
affected financial performance (profitability and solvency risk) in 1926 (1931). Because 
stock price data are available only for a small number of banks, in this analysis, we used 
returns on equity and the ratio of capital to deposits as indicators of profitability and 
solvency risk, respectively. However, our results confirm that the number of directors 
rarely affected the financial performance of banks significantly. Therefore, the number 
of directors was likely to be uncorrelated with, at least, the ex ante performance of 
banks. 
25  In a probit model incorporating instrumental variables that are estimated by 
maximum likelihood estimation, or by the minimum chi-squared two-step procedure 
proposed by Newey (1987), it is assumed that the endogenous variables are continuous. 
Hence, these models are not appropriate when the endogenous variables are binary. 19 
3.3. The Effect of Network Structure and Quality on Survivability 
Next, we investigate the effect of the structure and quality of the network on bank 
survivability. In Table 6, we focus on the effect of the network structure. In the 
estimation, we add the interaction term between NT and network measures used in 
Table 2 to the explanatory variables in equation (2). In columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we 
use “core degree” and “clustering coefficient,” respectively, as a network measure. In the 
estimation, we use the value of clustering coefficient plus one to distinguish between a 
bank without connections and one whose clustering coefficient value is zero. It can be 
confirmed from columns 1 and 2 that the interaction terms between NT and these 
network measure variables are negative, which suggests that banks that belonged to 
high-density subnetworks were less likely to fail. However, these coefficients are not 
statistically significant. In column 3, “average nearest neighbor degree” is used as a 
network measure variable. This interaction term is negative and statistically significant 
at the 10% level, which indicates that banks connected with banks having many 
connections were less likely to fail. In column 4, as a network measure, we use “size of 
component,” which represents the number of nodes (banks) in the component to which a 
bank belongs. The coefficient of its interaction term is negative, but not significant. 
Hence, the size of the network to which a bank belonged did not matter. In column 5, we 
use a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if a bank belongs to intraregional 
networks defined in Panel C of Table 2, and zero otherwise. As shown in column 5, the 
interaction term of the dummy variable for intraregional networks does not have a 
significant coefficient, which suggests that regional characteristics of network structure 
did not affect bank survivability. 
In Table 7, we examine the implications of network quality. It is hypothesized that 
a bank that had connections with banks that were performing well would be more likely 
to survive than banks with no such connections. To capture the quality of the network, 20 
we add to equation (2) the interaction term NT*WA(ROE), where WA(ROE) denotes the 
weighted average ROE of the connected banks. Column 1 reports the estimation results. 
Although the coefficient of NT is no longer negative, the coefficient of NT*WA(ROE) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis. That is, banks that had connections with profitable banks were less likely to 
fail. 
However, given that values of ROE are censored at zero because of the data 
limitations mentioned above, the coefficient of the interaction term NT*WA(ROE) may 
be biased. To check the robustness of the results, we split NT into two dummy variables, 
NTP and NTN, according to the ROE of connected banks. That is, NTP is unity if the 
values of ROE are positive for all connected banks, and NTN equals unity if ROE was 
not positive for at least one of the connected banks. We then add NTP, NTN, and 
NTP*WA(ROE) to equation (2). By using the new interaction term NTP*WA(ROE), the 
effect of network quality is estimated more accurately. Column 2 reports the estimation 
results. The coefficient of the interaction term NTP*WA(ROE) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. It is slightly larger than the coefficient of 
NT*WA(ROE) in column 1. We can calculate the marginal effects based on these 
estimates. According to our calculation, a 1% increase in the weighted average ROE of 
its connected banks lowers the probability of a bank’s failure by 0.80%26. In this sense, 
banks benefited when connected to banks that were performing well. 
To examine the effect of having a network with a badly performing bank, in 
column 3 we present estimates based on slightly different definitions of NTP and NTN. 
That is, we let NTN equal unity if ROE is not positive for all connected banks, and we let 
NTP equal unity if at least one connected bank has a positive ROE. As shown in column 
                                                 
26  We calculated it from the marginal effect where all explanatory variables are 
evaluated at their means. 21 
3, the coefficient of NTN is positive, which indicates that banks connected to badly 
performing banks were more likely to fail. However, this coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. In other words, we find no clear evidence that banks were adversely 
affected by being connected to badly performing banks. 
In summary, most of the variables about network measures did not have 
statistically significant effects, as shown in Table 6. On the other hand, we obtained 
strong evidence that banks that had connections with profitable banks were less likely 
to fail. Therefore, we can conclude that the quality of the network was more important 
for survivability of a bank than the structure of the network. 
 
4. Bank Networks and the Contagious Withdrawal of Deposits 
We now examine the effect of interbank networks on the ability of banks to collect 
deposits. As discussed in existing studies, it is possible that financial contagion spreads 
through interbank networks (Allen and Gale 2000; Freixas et al. 2000). For instance, if a 
bank closes because there is a run on that bank, the banks connected with it are more 
likely to be exposed to contagious runs. This is because depositors would suspect that 
connected banks would become insolvent and illiquid because of the closed bank’s 
defaults on its interbank loans. There is well-known anecdotal evidence that this 
occurred during Japan’s financial crisis of 1927 (the Showa Financial Crisis)27. Thus, we 
examine whether this type of contagious withdrawal of deposits occurred in prewar 
Japan. For this purpose, we estimate the following equation for the growth of deposits: 
GDEPOi = 0 + 1*NTi + 2*NTi*WA(GDEPO)i + 3*M&Ai + 4*SIZEi + 5*CAPDEPOi 
                                                 
27  At the beginning of the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, the run on the Tokyo 
Watanabe Bank immediately triggered a run on its family bank, the Akaji Savings Bank. 
Consequently, these two banks closed. 22 
+ 6*LIQUIDi + 7*ROEi + 8*SECURITYi + ui,  (4) 
where the dependent variable GDEPOi is the growth rate of deposits of bank i from the 
end of 1926 to the end of 1927. This period includes the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927, 
when nationwide bank runs led to the closure of 44 banks. In equation (4), the 
interaction term NTi*WA(GDEPO)i is used to capture the contagious effect of the 
deposits shock on the banks that had connections with bank i. The variable 
WA(GDEPO) is the weighted average growth rate of deposits of the banks connected 
with bank i. If the deposits of a bank fell because of withdrawals from banks in the same 
network, the coefficient on NTi*WA(GDEPO)i would be positive. In addition, given that 
the effect of positive growth of deposits of connected banks is not necessarily linear, we 
also estimate equation (4) by replacing NTi and NTi*WA(GDEPO)i with NTPi and NTNi, 
respectively. The dummy variable NTPi is unity if the weighted average growth rate of 
deposits of the banks connected with bank i, is positive, and zero otherwise. The variable 
NTNi is a dummy variable that is unity if the weighted average growth rate of deposits 
of the connected banks is negative, and zero otherwise. If the deposits of a bank fell 
because of contagious withdrawals from within the same network, the coefficient of 
NTNi would be negative. The dummy variable M&A is unity if a bank experienced 
mergers or acquisitions in 1927, and zero otherwise. For banks that experienced 
mergers or acquisitions in 1927, to calculate GDEPO, we use the deposits of 1926 for the 
pro forma banks28. In addition, measures of bank size and the financial ratios used in 
equation (2) are included as explanatory variables. We also include area dummies to 
                                                 
28 The value of a pro forma bank denotes the combined values of the balance sheets of 
participating banks. With respect to other variables, the values of acquiring banks are 
used. 23 
control for area-specific shocks29. Our sample size is reduced by 183 (out of 1,007) 
because of bank exits. In addition, we excluded eight banks classed as outliers because 
the growth rate of their deposits exceeded 100%. This left 816 observations for 
estimation. 
Table 8 shows the estimation results. In column 1, the coefficient of 
NT*WA(GDEPO) is positive, which is consistent with the contagious withdrawals of 
deposits. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. In column 2, the area 
dummies are excluded to account for the possibility that the area dummies capture the 
contagious effect of networks. However, as shown in column 2, the coefficient of 
NT*WA(GDEPO) is statistically insignificant, as before, but is slightly larger than 
before. Thus, we find no strong evidence of the contagious withdrawal of deposits within 
networks. 
In column 3, to examine the contagion effect, we use NTN and NTP as the network 
variables. The coefficient of NTN is negative, which is consistent with the contagious 
withdrawals of deposits. However, this effect is not statistically significant. In addition, 
although the coefficient of NTP is positive, it is not statistically significant. In column 4, 
which excludes area dummies, the coefficient of NTN is positive, which is inconsistent 
with the contagious withdrawals of deposits. However, the coefficient of NTP is positive 
and statistically significant at the 10% level, which suggests that banks with 
connections to banks whose deposits increased were capable of collecting more deposits. 
The coefficients of ROE and CAPDEPO are positive and statistically significant, 
which implies that banks performing well were more likely to collect deposits. In other 
words, fundamental factors explain deposits growth better than do contagious factors. 
                                                 
29  We split the whole country into 10 areas: Hokkaido/Tohoku, North Kanto, South 
Kanto, Tokyo, Chubu/Hokuriku, Tokai, Osaka/Hyogo, other Kansai, Chugoku/Shikoku, 
and Kyushu/Okinawa. 24 
This is consistent with the findings of Yabushita and Inoue (1993) and Okazaki (2007), 
who examined the factors affecting the probability of bank closures during the Showa 
Financial Crisis of 1927. They found that fundamental factors, including profitability, 
principally explain the probability of bank failures. In summary, there is no strong 
evidence for the contagious effect of interbank networks. 
Next, we check the robustness of the results. First, we correct for the potential 
endogeneity of interbank networks, as in Subsection 3.2. Again, we use N_BANK and 
N_DIRECTOR as instruments for the network variables. We show the instrumental 
variable regressions in columns 5–8. These results show that, having controlled for the 
endogeneity of interbank networks, the coefficients of WA(GDEPO) and NTN are 
statistically insignificant. 
Second, to correct for the potential selection bias arising from bank exits, we 
estimate equation (4) by employing the sample selection model. In this model, the 
selection equation explains the probability of exit, and includes as explanatory variables 
SIZE, EQ, BOJ, MS, CAPDEPO, LIQUID, ROE, and SECURITY, which are the 
variables used in equation (2). We report the estimation results for the main equation in 
Appendix Table 1. After correcting for potential sample selection bias, the coefficients of 
WA(GDEPO) and NTN are statistically insignificant. 
 
5. Bank Networks and Consolidation 
As mentioned above, a large wave of bank consolidations occurred in Japan in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s after the implementation of the Bank Law of 1927. This law 
prescribed that a bank should, in principle, have capital of no less than one million yen, 
and that an existing bank whose capital was less than this was required to meet this 25 
requirement within five years30. Although more than half of the ordinary banks did not 
meet this criterion when the law was enacted in 1928, none of these smaller banks was 
allowed to increase its capital in principle. Therefore, these banks were obliged to 
implement consolidations or liquidations. Thus, in this section, we address the question 
of how interbank networks were related to the process and results of these 
consolidations. 
5.1. Bank Networks and Choice of Merger Partners 
First, we examine the effects of interbank networks through director interlocking 
on the process of consolidations. Most banks whose capital was below the minimum 
requirement searched for consolidation counterparts in order to avoid liquidation. How 
did these banks choose their counterparts? What role did the networks play in the 
process? It is possible that interbank networks affected the choice of counterparts. For 
instance, a bank might have been uncertain about the soundness of another bank that 
was a potential candidate for a merger because of informational asymmetry. In this case, 
an interbank network based on director interlocking might have mitigated such 
information asymmetry between the two banks and, thereby, resolved the adverse 
selection problem. Moreover, directors serving both banks might have been able to 
coordinate negotiations over consolidation to reduce transaction costs31. Therefore, one 
would expect banks to be more likely to be consolidated with banks in the same network 
than with those outside the network. 
                                                 
30 According to the 1927 Bank Law, in principle, a bank should have capital of at least 
one million yen, and an existing bank whose capital was less than this was required to 
meet this requirement within five years. If the headquarters of the bank was located in 
Tokyo or Osaka, the minimum capital was two million yen, while it was 500,000 yen if 
the headquarters was located in a town or village whose population was at least 10,000. 
31 D’aveni and Kesner (1993) show that target firms are less likely to resist a takeover 
when their managers and the acquiring firm’s outsiders have shared connections to the 
same prestigious networks. 26 
The information on each bank merger is obtained from Ginko Jiko Geppo (Monthly 
Bank Affairs) edited by the BOJ. From this information, we can identify which of the 
1,007 sample banks participated in consolidations between January 1927 and December 
1929, and which bank was a counterpart. Table 9 compares the proportion of banks 
within networks in the total number of merged banks with the proportion of banks 
within networks in the total number of banks that were not merged. This comparison 
reveals that the proportion of banks within networks was significantly larger among 
merged banks. This suggests that interbank networks had a significant positive effect on 
bank mergers. 
We test this hypothesis by using data on the events of individual bank 
consolidations that occurred between January 1927 and December 1929. From the 
consolidation events reported in Ginko Jiko Geppo, we selected those for which 
information on the directors involved was available for all participating banks. This 
yielded information on 173 events. Table 10 shows the number and proportion of 
intranetwork consolidations in which the participating banks were connected with each 
other before the consolidation. In cases in which the number of participating banks was 
more than two, an event was regarded as an intranetwork consolidation if there had 
been at least one connection among the participants. In Panel A, consolidations are 
classified into three categories according to Ginko Jiko Geppo: absorption, acquisition, 
and combination into a new bank. In this context, combination into a new bank is a form 
of consolidation under which a new bank is established after the dissolution of all 
participants. 
In more than 30% of the consolidations, networks already existed among the 
participating banks. By observing the different types of consolidations, we found that 
the proportion of intranetwork consolidations in the “combination into a new bank” 
category was approximately double the proportion in the other categories. In addition, 27 
Panel B distinguishes between “one-to-one consolidation” and “more than two 
consolidations” with respect to the number of participating banks. These results indicate 
that this proportion is higher in the “more than two consolidations” case than in the 
“one-to-one consolidation” case. 
In interpreting the above findings, we use Kin’yu Kenkyu-Kai (1934), which 
comprehensively surveyed bank consolidations in Japan in this period, as a basic 
reference. According to this reference, participant banks tended to combine into a new 
bank when the banks were equally powerful. However, in general, negotiations over 
consolidations are thought to be more likely to fail when many equally powerful 
participants are involved. Integrating these points into the results in Table 10, our 
interpretation is that interbank networks facilitated coordination among merger 
participants, particularly when negotiation costs were high. 
Panel C classifies consolidations into intraregional consolidations and 
interregional consolidations. Whereas the former refers to consolidations in which all 
participating banks operated in the same prefecture, the latter refers to other 
consolidations. Panel C shows that intranetwork consolidations were more common 
among intraregional consolidations than among interregional consolidations. 
Panel D classifies consolidations into policy-promoted consolidations and strategic 
consolidations, following Okazaki and Sawada (2007). That is, we first classified banks 
into those that met the minimum capital criterion of the 1927 Bank Law and those that 
did not. Then, we classified a consolidation that involved at least one participating bank 
not meeting the minimum capital criterion as a policy-promoted consolidation, and we 
classified a consolidation in which all the participants met the criterion as a strategic 28 
consolidation32. Panel D shows that intranetwork consolidations were more common 
among strategic consolidations than among policy-promoted consolidations. We expect 
the negotiation costs incurred in strategic consolidations to exceed those incurred in 
policy-promoted consolidations. This is because, in strategic consolidations, a bank 
meeting the minimum capital criterion of the 1927 law had no need to merge with 
another bank in the event that the participants were unable to agree on merger terms. 
Hence, one can infer that interbank networks facilitated coordination among merger 
participants when negotiation costs were high. 
The results reported in Panels A and C must be interpreted with care. In the 
context of Panel A, it is possible that participating banks were more likely to have 
connections among themselves when combining into a new bank, simply because the 
number of participants was larger in this case. In the context of the results in Panel C, 
intranetwork consolidations were more common among intraregional consolidations 
simply because the density of networks was higher within the same prefecture, as we 
showed in Section 2. 
Thus, it is necessary to examine the role of interbank networks in determining 
merger partners, controlling for these other factors. Thus, using the data on 320 banks 
that participated in 173 consolidations that occurred from 1927 to 1929, we tested 
whether a connection between a pair of banks raised the probability of consolidation 
between them. The equation to be estimated is as follows: 
Pr(MERGEij = 1) = F(0 + 1*NTij + 2*PREFij), i  j,  (5) 
                                                 
32 The information on the addresses of the headquarters was obtained from Ginko Soran 
(The Comprehensive List of Banks). We obtained the information on the population of 
the city, town, or village in which the headquarters of each bank was located from 
Nippon Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (Statistical Year Book of the Japanese Empire). 29 
where MERGEij is a dummy variable that is unity if bank i and bank j merged between 
1927 and 1929, and zero otherwise. The NTij dummy variable is unity if there was 
director interlocking between bank i and bank j in 1926, and zero otherwise. A positive 
coefficient of NTij suggests that a network between the two banks made it easier for 
them to merge. The dummy variable PREFij is unity if the headquarters of banks i and j 
were located in the same prefecture, and zero otherwise. We estimated equation (5) as a 
logit model for all possible pairs of banks33. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 11. The result in column 1 is for the 
full sample of consolidation observations. The coefficient of NT is positive and 
statistically significant, which suggests that banks preferred to merge with banks with 
which they were already connected. In columns 2–4, the consolidations are classified 
into absorptions, acquisitions, and combinations into a new bank, respectively. Although 
the coefficient of NT is positive and statistically significant in all cases, it is larger for 
combinations into new banks, which is consistent with the results in Panel A of Table 10. 
Hence, it can be concluded that interbank networks facilitated coordination among 
merger participants, particularly when negotiation costs were high. 
In Panel B, consolidations are classified into intraregional and interregional 
consolidations. The explanatory variable PREFij is excluded. The coefficient of NT is 
positive and statistically significant for both intraregional and interregional 
consolidations, with the former being larger, which is consistent with the results in 
Panel C of Table 10. 
In Panel C, consolidations are classified into policy-promoted and strategic 
consolidations. The coefficient of NT is positive and statistically significant for both 
                                                 
33 The total number of pairs of banks i and j is N*(N – 1)/2 after removing pairings of the 
same bank. Therefore, among 320 banks, there are 51,040 pairs. 30 
policy-promoted and strategic consolidations, with the latter being larger. This indicates 
that networks played a more important role in strategic consolidations. 
In summary, interbank networks facilitated consolidation with other banks, and 
were more important in consolidations in which negotiation costs were high. 
5.2. Bank Networks and Post-merger Performance 
We have presented evidence that interbank networks facilitated consolidations 
within networks. How, then, did interbank networks affect the results of the 
consolidations? To be more specific, did intranetwork consolidations have a more 
positive effect on bank performance than other consolidations? For example, did 
networks reduce the costs of unifying different organizations? To address these issues, 
we estimate the effects of intranetwork consolidations on post-merger financial 
performance. We follow the methodology of Okazaki and Sawada (2007), who used data 
on 1927–1932 events to examine the effect of consolidations promoted by the 1927 Bank 
Law on the financial performance of banks. These authors estimated the effect of 
consolidations on bank performance by comparing the change in the return on assets 
(ROA) and the change in the growth rate of deposits from year T–1 to years T+2 and T+3 
between consolidated banks and nonconsolidated banks, with T being the year in which 
the consolidation occurred34. In our analysis, we focus on consolidation events from 1927 
to 1929. 
First, we select consolidation events. To identify clearly the effects of consolidation, 
we exclude from the analysis banks that participated in multiple consolidations from the 
beginning of year T–1 to the end of year T+335. In addition, we limit our attention to 
                                                 
34 Furthermore, to capture the effect of policy-promoted consolidations, the authors split 
the effect of consolidations into a policy-promoted effect and a strategic effect. 
35 We include in these events cases in which one bank merges with other banks twice in 
the same year, and we treat these consolidations as single instances of merger. There 31 
consolidation events for which data on director interlocking were available for all 
participating banks. This yielded information on 66 consolidation events. Next, we select 
the control samples for each year (1927–1929) for comparison with the consolidated 
banks. The control sample banks, which correspond to the consolidated banks in year T, 
refer to the banks that were not involved in any consolidations from the beginning of 
year T–1 to the end of year T+3. For example, the control samples for 1927 are the banks 
that were not involved in any consolidations from 1926 to 1930. These are compared 
with the banks that were consolidated in 1927. Event observations for 1927 were the 
consolidated banks in 1927 and their control sample banks. In the same way, event 
observations were constructed for 1928 and 1929 to yield unbalanced panel data for 
three years, 1927, 1928, and 1929, which consist of 1,075 event observations. Table 12 
shows the number of consolidations and control samples by year. The consolidations are 
classified into intranetwork consolidations and other consolidations. Approximately 30% 
of the consolidations are classified as intranetwork consolidations, in which the 
participating banks had a mutual connection through director interlocking. 
For our empirical specification, the model of Okazaki and Sawada (2007) was 
modified slightly to capture explicitly the effects of intranetwork consolidations. That is, 
we estimated the following model: 
Yit = 0 + 1*M&Ait + 2*NTit*M&Ait + Xit + it,  (6) 
where i indexes the bank, and t indexes the year. The dependent variable Yit is the 
change in either the ROA or the growth rate of deposits from the end of year T–2 to the 
                                                                                                                                               
were four such cases: Dai-Hachiju-go Bank (1927); Juni Bank (1928); Ogaki Kyoritsu 
Bank (1928); and Gojuroku Bank (1928). 32 
end of year T+2 or T+336. For the values of Yit for the consolidated banks in year T–2, 
those of the pro forma banks were used. This means that we used the sum of the balance 
sheets of the banks participating in consolidations. The explanatory variable M&A is a 
dummy variable that is unity if a bank participated in consolidations, and zero 
otherwise. A positive coefficient of M&A indicates that consolidation had a positive effect 
on bank performance. The dummy NT*M&A is unity if a bank participated in an 
intranetwork consolidation in year T, and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient of 
NT*M&A indicates that intranetwork consolidations had a more beneficial effect on 
bank performance than other consolidations. We are particularly interested in the effect 
of this variable. X is a vector of additional explanatory variables. Following Okazaki and 
Sawada (2007), we include the natural log of total assets (SIZE), the change in the 
number of branch offices (BRANCH), and the dummy variable URBAN, which 
indicates whether the headquarters of the bank was located in an urban area (i.e., in 
Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, or Hyogo Prefectures)37. In addition, for the 
model in which the dependent variable is the change in the ROA, the loan–asset ratio 
(LOAN/ASSET) is included to capture the asset risk of banks. Equation (6) is estimated 
by pooled OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (White 1980). 
Table 13 reports the estimation results for the model of the growth rate of deposits. 
Columns 1–4 report results based on the whole sample of banks. The results reported in 
columns 5–8 are based on excluding outliers, defined as cases in which the growth rate 
of a bank’s deposits exceeded 100%. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the 
growth rate of deposits from the end of year T–2 to the end of year T+2. In columns 3 and 
                                                 
36 Because consolidations were frequently accompanied by asset reevaluation, the value 
of the assets of the post-consolidation bank was adjusted according to the following 
equation:  3 2 1 , ),i ASSET (ASSET ASSET ASSET T i T T
*
i T        . 
37 The year dummies were also included as explanatory variables to control for shocks 
common to observations relating to the same year. 33 
4, the dependent variable is the growth rate of deposits from the end of year T–2 to the 
end of year T+3. Column 1 reports estimation results based on excluding NT*M&A. The 
coefficient of the consolidation dummy (M&A) is positive and statistically significant. 
This suggests that consolidations enhanced the ability of banks to collect deposits, which 
is consistent with the findings of Okazaki and Sawada (2007). In column 2, the variable 
NT*M&A is added to capture the effect of intranetwork consolidations. Although the 
coefficient of M&A remains positive and statistically significant, the coefficient of 
NT*M&A is negative but statistically insignificant. This suggests that intranetwork 
consolidations did not have greater beneficial effects on growth rates of deposits than 
other consolidations. Columns 3 and 4 report results based on using changes in deposits 
from T–2 to T+3 as the dependent variable. In column 4, the coefficient of NT*M&A is 
positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that the effect of 
intranetwork consolidations exceeded that of other consolidations. Excluding outliers 
did not qualitatively change the results (see columns 5–8). In summary, in prewar Japan, 
consolidation itself had a positive effect on growth rates of deposits, but this positive 
effect was not significantly larger for intranetwork consolidations. 
Table 14 reports the estimation results for equation (6), with the change in the 
ROA being the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 (columns 3 and 4) report results for 
performance changes from the end of year T–2 to year T+2 (from the end of year T–2 to 
year T+3). In columns 1 and 3, the coefficients of the consolidation dummy (M&A) are 
negative but not statistically significant. In columns 2 and 4, the coefficients of 
NT*M&A are positive and negative, respectively, but not statistically significant. 
Therefore, there is no clear evidence that intranetwork consolidations had a more 
beneficial effect on bank profitability than other consolidations. 
In columns 5–8, we report results for equation (6), with the change in the ROA 
being the dependent variable, taking into account that the profit data are censored at 34 
zero. Having eliminated from the sample those banks with a recorded profit of zero, we 
estimated equation (6) by maximum likelihood, correcting for sample selection. 
Following Okazaki and Sawada (2007), we included in the selection equation the 
consolidation dummy (M&A), SIZE, URBAN, LOAN/ASSET, and year dummies, which 
we expect will explain cross-sectional differences in bank profits. (The estimated 
selection equation is not reported.) The estimation results for the main equation are 
reported in columns 5–8. These results provide no evidence that intranetwork 
consolidation had a more beneficial effect on bank profitability than other 
consolidations. 
In summary, the results obtained in this section indicate that interbank networks 
facilitated within-network consolidations by reducing the costs of coordination, but that 
intranetwork consolidations did not strongly enhance post-merger performance. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated the structure and implications of interbank networks, 
focusing on director interlocking in prewar Japan. It was found that approximately half 
of the banks had at least one connection with another bank through director interlocking. 
The structure of the network through director interlocking is revealed to be assortative, 
relatively low clustered, and composed of numerous components. Next, we examined the 
impact of interbank networks through director interlocking on the survivability of banks 
to find that a bank with a network was less likely to fail than a bank without one. 
Furthermore, a bank that had a network with profitable banks was less likely to fail. On 
the other hand, the network structure rarely affected bank survivability. In other words, 
the quality of the network was more important to surviving in the banking industry in 35 
prewar Japan than the structure of the network. These results suggest that interbank 
networks through director interlocks contributed to the stability of the financial system. 
Furthermore, we examined whether financial contagion spread through interbank 
networks, considering the possibility that our measure of the network included financial 
relationships. However, we found no strong evidence of financial contagion through 
interbank networks. 
Finally, the paper found that the networks based on director interlocking also 
affected bank consolidations, which surged in Japan in the 1920s and 1930s. Banks 
tended to consolidate with banks that had connections with them through director 
interlocking. This suggests that interbank networks played a role in coordinating bank 
mergers. On the other hand, whether banks merged with other banks from inside or 
outside their networks did not significantly affect their post-merger performance. 
However, given that bank mergers positively affected deposits (Okazaki and Sawada 
2007), interlocking networks of directors contributed to stabilizing the financial system, 
in the sense that they facilitated bank mergers. 
 
 
Appendix:  The Mathematical  Expressions of Network Measures 
A.1 Clustering Coefficient 
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where eij is a variable which takes a value of unity if bank i had a connection with bank j. 
Also, eih (ejh) is a variable which takes a value of unity if bank i (j) had a connection with 
bank h. ki is the degree of bank i.   
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A.2 Degree Correlation Coefficient 
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where M is the number of edges (links), ji ki represents the degrees of nodes at the ends 
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Year_1931Figure 2 Average performance of connected banks in 1926 and 1931
Year1926
Year 1931
Source:Directory of Banks and Companies (the 1926 and 1931 issues)
Note: These figures indicate distributions on the quality of networks with respect to
the 587 banks in 1926 and 271 banks in 1931, which had at least one connection with
another bank. The quality of the network of a bank (Bank A for example) is measured
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Panel A: Year 1926














Total  1007 100%
Number of connections ≧1 587 58.3%
Panel B: Year 1931











Total  597 100%
Number of connections ≧1 271 45.4%Table2　Structure of interbank networks
Panel A: Distribution of the number of nodes (banks) in each component
Year 1926 Year 1931
Number of  Number of 
Components Components
2 8 4 1 6 8 24 59 0
3 21 63 3 16 48
41 14 4 4 3 1 2
5 4 20 5 2 10
6 2 12 6 5 30
7 3 2 1 919
10 1 10 11 1 11
12 2 24 15 1 15
16 1 16 46 1 46







Total  137 587
Panel B  Network Measures
Year 1926 (obs=587) Year 1931(obs=271)
Types Mean (Value) Std. Dev. Mean (Value) Std. Dev.
Degree (Number of connections) 2.068 1.659 1.875 1.584
Core-degree 1.566 0.877 1.458 0.953
Clustering Coefficient  0.241 0.383 0.190 0.360
Assortativity coefficient 0.364 - 0.554 -
Average Nearest Neighbor Degree 2.768 2.025 2.455 1.790
Panel C Regional characteristics of interbank network.
Types Year 1926 Year 1931
Intra-regional network 402 187










Panel A  Banks with networks
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max T-statistics
Capitals/Deposits 858 0.891 3.759 0.018 101.377 -0.76
Reserves/Total assets 858 0.090 0.085 0.000 0.767 2.65
ROE 858 0.114 0.077 0.000 0.732 3.57
Securities/Loans 858 0.198 0.310 0.000 3.791 -0.85
Deposits/Loans  858 0.920 0.619 0.003 10.382 0.23
Amount of Total deposits (thousand yen 858 15714.90 65426.28 1.95 663882.5 4.51
Amount of Total assets (thousand yen) 858 19358.65 78652.53 56.71 775622.4 4.51
Panel B  Banks without networks
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capitals/Deposits 746 1.093 7.275 0.052 195.097
Reserves/Total assets 746 0.093 0.083 0.000 0.641
ROE 746 0.100 0.078 0.000 0.698
Securities/Loans 746 0.214 0.438 0.000 6.447
Deposits/Loans  746 1.298 9.292 0.008 253.108
Amount of Total deposits (thousand yen 746 4544.96 18561.57 1.59 425911.3
Amount of Total assets (thousand yen) 746 5927.27 22054.92 176.27 505237.1
T-statistic tests the hypothesis that there is no difference between banks within networks and
ones outside networksTable4 Interbank networks and survivability
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
NT -0.2305*** -0.2451***                
(0.0811) (0.0857)                
N_CONNECTIONS -0.0751**                
(0.0342)                
Dummy [N_CONNECTION=1] -0.2650** 
(0.1034)   
Dummy [N_CONNECTION=2] -0.1993   
(0.1455)   
Dummy [N_CONNECTION=3] -0.0499   
(0.1865)   
Dummy [N_CONNECTION≧4] -0.4405** 
(0.2171)   
SIZE -0.2478*** -0.1216** -0.1186** -0.1187** 
(0.0457) (0.0473) (0.0482) (0.0484)   
EQ 0.4643*** 0.3797*** 0.4117*** 0.3892***
(0.1111) (0.1237) (0.1244) (0.1239)   
BOJ 0.0742 0.0403 0.0385 0.0467   
(0.1263) (0.1360) (0.1356) (0.1364)   
MS -0.0143*** -0.0133** -0.0129** -0.0127** 
(0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)   
CAPDEPO 0.1070*** 0.1038*** 0.1068***
(0.0305) (0.0312) (0.0305)   
LIQUID -1.0287 -1.0585 -1.0345   
(0.7041) (0.6989) (0.6995)   
ROE -6.0516*** -6.1373*** -6.0778***
(1.3827) (1.3866) (1.3836)   
SECURITY -0.1861 -0.1909 -0.1894   
(0.1506) (0.1510) (0.1510)   
INTERCEPT 2.7616*** 1.6238** 1.5294** 1.5654** 
(0.6558) (0.6804) (0.6902) (0.6948)   
Year group dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.197 0.195 0.199   
Log Likelihood -608.0363 -545.0208 -546.3215 -543.9348  
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604   
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Table5 Interbank networks and survivability, controlling for the endogeneity of interbank network
Methodology
Dependent variable Pr (Fail=1) NT Pr (Fail=1) NT Pr (Fail=1) N_CONNECTION
Explanatory variables
(Endogenous Variables)
NT -1.4105*** -1.4259***                
(0.1740) (0.1499)                
N_CONNECTION -0.8206***                
(0.2279)                
(Instrument Variables)
N_BANK 0.0027** 0.0028** 0.0030*  
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0016)   
N_DIRECTOR 0.0508*** 0.0539*** 0.0806***
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0127)   
(Other Control Variables)
SIZE -0.1460*** 0.0985*** -0.0389 0.0939*** 0.0860 0.2087***
(0.0429) (0.0316) (0.0410) (0.0326) (0.0813) (0.0376)   
EQ 0.2376** -0.2180** 0.1866 -0.1907* 0.5754*** 0.3414***
(0.1152) (0.1005) (0.1146) (0.1015) (0.1599) (0.1166)   
BOJ 0.1130 0.1765* 0.0816 0.1848* 0.0836 0.1208   
(0.1125) (0.0965) (0.1180) (0.0977) (0.1607) (0.1132)   
MS -0.0136*** 0.0004 -0.0122*** 0.0003 -0.0129** 0.0048   
(0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0045)   
CAPDEPO 0.0854*** 0.0000 0.1074*** 0.0001   
(0.0250) (0.0056) (0.0316) (0.0066)   
LIQUID -1.0450** -0.2109 -1.4948** -0.4493   
(0.4528) (0.3905) (0.6289) (0.4506)   
ROE -4.6253*** 0.5201 -6.0070*** 0.3064   
(0.7453) (0.4716) (0.8541) (0.5431)   
SECURITY -0.2070** -0.0613 -0.3830** -0.1843*  
(0.1033) (0.0908) (0.1540) (0.1046)   
INTERCEPT 2.2007*** -1.8294*** 1.1838** -1.8371*** -0.5970 -2.9108***











Notes: Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*". The figures in parentheses are
standard errors.
1604 1604 1604
-1659.8589 -1594.1524 -2897.7127Table6 Network structure and survivability
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
NT -0.1776 -0.0417 -0.0854 -0.2092**  -0.2598***
(0.1361) (0.2353) (0.1205) (0.1013)    (0.0960)   
NT*(Core Degree)   -0.0463                
(0.0731)                
-0.1687                
(0.1836)                
-0.0642*                
(0.0349)                
NT*(Size of component)   -0.0031                   
(0.0049)                   
0.0523   
(0.1496)   
SIZE -0.1193** -0.1204** -0.1137** -0.1175**  -0.1235***
(0.0477) (0.0473) (0.0476) (0.0481)    (0.0479)   
EQ 0.3874*** 0.3855*** 0.4100*** 0.3983*** 0.3740***
(0.1249) (0.1243) (0.1266) (0.1291)    (0.1264)   
BOJ 0.0409 0.0380 0.0299 0.0398    0.0384   
(0.1360) (0.1363) (0.1356) (0.1361)    (0.1368)   
MS -0.0132** -0.0133** -0.0129** -0.0131**  -0.0134** 
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)    (0.0056)   
CAPDEPO 0.1061*** 0.1057*** 0.1110*** 0.1067*** 0.1070***
(0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0298) (0.0304)    (0.0305)   
LIQUID -1.0378 -1.0376 -1.0220 -1.0146    -1.0226   
(0.7041) (0.7074) (0.7064) (0.7067)    (0.7024)   
ROE -6.0628*** -6.0592*** -6.0655*** -6.0503*** -6.0496***
(1.3799) (1.3790) (1.3818) (1.3836)    (1.3809)   
SECURITY -0.1882 -0.1864 -0.1889 -0.1864    -0.1840   
(0.1508) (0.1502) (0.1489) (0.1496)    (0.1507)   
INTERCEPT 1.5930** 1.6103** 1.4972** 1.5581**  1.6541** 
(0.6865) (0.6789) (0.6846) (0.6936)    (0.6918)   
Year group dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.198 0.199 0.197 0.197   
Log Likelihood -544.8214 -544.5431 -543.4980 -544.7944 -544.9518   
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604   
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".






Neighbor Degree)Table7 Network quality and survivability
Variables [1] [2] [3]
NT 0.0845                
(0.1450)                
NT*WA(ROE) -3.6304***                
(1.3050)                
NTP 0.1944 0.0487   
(0.2086) (0.1734)   
NTP*WA(ROE) -4.3938** -3.3478** 
(1.8349) (1.5067)   
NTN -0.1396 0.1554   
(0.1558) (0.2184)   
SIZE -0.1169** -0.1215** -0.1157** 
(0.0473) (0.0476) (0.0473)   
EQ 0.3905*** 0.3902*** 0.3887***
(0.1222) (0.1223) (0.1224)   
BOJ 0.0449 0.0412 0.0441   
(0.1364) (0.1364) (0.1365)   
MS -0.0132** -0.0132** -0.0133** 
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)   
CAPDEPO 0.1055*** 0.1023*** 0.1062***
(0.0317) (0.0321) (0.0316)   
LIQUID -0.9858 -1.0735 -0.9708   
(0.6972) (0.6992) (0.6970)   
ROE -5.9566*** -6.0276*** -5.9354***
(1.3565) (1.3595) (1.3553)   
SECURITY -0.1706 -0.1728 -0.1702   
(0.1464) (0.1461) (0.1466)   
INTERCEPT 1.5862** 1.6649** 1.5669** 
(0.6865) (0.6910) (0.6871)   
Year group dummy Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.205 0.204 0.205   
Log Likelihood -539.8406 -540.1387 -539.7528  
Observations 1604 1604 1604   
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Table8 Interbank networks and contagious withdrawal of deposits
Dependent variable: Deposit Growth Rate
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
NT 0.00561 0.0133                 0.191 0.207                
(0.0146) (0.0143)                 (0.141) (0.133)                
NT*WA(GDEPO) 0.0112 0.0144                 0.138 -0.260                
(0.0105) (0.0109)                 (0.698) (0.592)                
NTN -0.00332 0.00269    0.0792 0.334   
(0.0175) (0.0171)    (0.446) (0.267)   
NTP 0.0191 0.0293*   0.247 0.143   
(0.0165) (0.0164)    (0.398) (0.221)   
M&A 0.0376 0.0511** 0.0374 0.0510**  0.0562 0.0414 0.0487 0.0548   
(0.0232) (0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0230)    (0.0650) (0.0543) (0.0331) (0.0365)   
SIZE -0.0122* -0.0147** -0.0121* -0.0146**  -0.0289 -0.0217 -0.0232** -0.0286** 
(0.00722) (0.00715) (0.00722) (0.00714)    (0.0278) (0.0203) (0.0102) (0.0123)   
ROE 0.284** 0.321** 0.286** 0.324**  0.225 0.301 0.259 0.232   
(0.128) (0.125) (0.128) (0.126)    (0.161) (0.187) (0.176) (0.157)   
CAPDEPO 0.00111*** 0.000524 0.00112*** 0.000543*   0.00108 0.000896** 0.00119*** 0.000794   
(0.000420) (0.000326) (0.000419) (0.000324)    (0.000673) (0.000437) (0.000454) (0.000508)   
LIQUID -0.131 -0.168 -0.134 -0.173    -0.0861 -0.114 -0.123 -0.0313   
(0.116) (0.118) (0.116) (0.118)    (0.145) (0.165) (0.179) (0.174)   
SECURITY 0.0758*** 0.0651*** 0.0756*** 0.0649*** 0.0633** 0.0517 0.0646** 0.0530   
(0.0240) (0.0249) (0.0241) (0.0250)    (0.0285) (0.0457) (0.0285) (0.0397)   
INTERCEPT 0.113 0.111 0.110 0.108    0.247 0.113 0.186 0.186   
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106)    (0.345) (0.248) (0.121) (0.136)   
Area dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
R2 0.058 0.029 0.059 0.030    - - - -
Observations 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Banks not merged Merged banks
Within networks 265 155
Outside networks 292 295
% of banks outside networks 52.4% 65.6%
Table 9 Comparison of the ratio of banks with connections among merged
banks to that among banks not merged during the period 1927-29Table10 Interbank networks and bank consolidations during the period 1927-29
Panel A:  Form of consolidation
Types Number of events Number of Intra-network %
Absorptions 94 27 28.7%
Combination into a new bank 25 14 56.0%
Acquisitions 54 14 25.9%
Total 173 55 31.8%
.
Panel B: Number of participants
Types Number of events Number of Intra-network %
One-to-one 154 42 27.3%
More than two 19 13 68.4%
Total 173 55 31.8%
Panel C: Regional characteristics
Types Number of events Number of Intra-network %
Intra-regional 146 49 33.6%
Inter-regional 27 6 22.2%
Total 173 55 31.8%
Panel D: Policy-promoted versus Strategic consolidations 
Types Number of events Number of Intra-network %
Policy-promoted 79 23 29.1%
Strategic consolidation 94 32 34.0%
Total 173 55 31.8%Table11 Interbank networks and choice of partner banks
Panel A: Type of Consolidations
All consolidationsAbsorptions Acquisitions
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
NT 2.8113*** 1.9442*** 2.0950*** 2.6166***
(0.2466) (0.2724) (0.3582) (0.3054)
PREF 5.0681*** 5.0545*** 4.2533*** 6.9611***
(0.2116) (0.2919) (0.3484) (1.0466)
INTERCEPT -7.4196*** -8.0405*** -8.2492*** -10.8191***
(0.1817) (0.2495) (0.2772) (0.9982)
Pseudo 0.472 0.398 0.299 0.498
Observations 51040 51040 51040 51040




(0.1878) (0.4640)   
INTERCEPT -5.9221*** -7.6589***
(0.0859) (0.2041)   
Pseudo 0.190 0.080   
Observations 51040 51040




(0.2739) (0.2513)   
PREF 5.4003*** 4.6316***
(0.3429) (0.2665)   
INTERCEPT -8.4155*** -7.8226***
(0.3010) (0.2233)   
Pseudo 0.425 0.402   
Observations 51040 51040
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Combination
into a new bankTable12 Number of samples by event year 
Event Year Other consolidations Control banks
1927 5 12 414
1928 9 19 376
1929 6 15 285
Total 20 46 1075
Intra-network
consolidationsTable13 The effect of consolidations on deposit growth rate
All samples Excluding outliers
Dependent variable: Deposit growth rate from T-2 to T+2 or  T+3
Window [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3]
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
M&A 0.1309*** 0.1317*** 0.1019** 0.0863* 0.1558*** 0.1518*** 0.1399*** 0.1169** 
(0.0396) (0.0456) (0.0440) (0.0477) (0.0388) (0.0439) (0.0434) (0.0466)   
M&A*NT -0.0027 0.0511 0.0130 0.0764   
(0.0758) (0.0882) (0.0814) (0.0945)   
SIZE -0.0241 -0.0242 -0.0105 -0.0103 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0120 0.0123   
(0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0099)   
URBAN -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0245 -0.0244 -0.0499** -0.0499** -0.0566** -0.0565** 
(0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0250) (0.0250)   
⊿BRANCH 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0339*** 0.0340*** 0.0431*** 0.0432*** 0.0466*** 0.0469***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0063)   
Dummy [Year1928] -0.0375 -0.0375 -0.0390 -0.0391 -0.1041*** -0.1041*** -0.1037*** -0.1039***
(0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0512) (0.0512) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0266) (0.0266)   
Dummy [Year1929] -0.1473*** -0.1473*** -0.0893** -0.0893** -0.1580*** -0.1580*** -0.1040*** -0.1041***
(0.0309) (0.0310) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0273) (0.0273)   
INTERCEPT 0.3714 0.3715 0.0811 0.0779 0.0421 0.0414 -0.2553* -0.2597*  
(0.2443) (0.2445) (0.2571) (0.2575) (0.1427) (0.1425) (0.1460) (0.1460)   
Observations 1075 1075 1075 1075 1053 1053 1055 1055   
R2 0.0395 0.0395 0.0341 0.0342 0.0832 0.0833 0.0837 0.0843  
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Table14 The effect of consolidations on ROA
OLS Selection model
Dependent variable Dependent variable: Change of ROA from T-2 to T+2 or  T+3
Window [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+2] [T-2, T+3] [T-2, T+3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
M&A -0.0035 -0.0043 -0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0041 -0.0008 -0.0004   
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0032)   
M&A*NT 0.0028 -0.0017 0.0031 -0.0015   
(0.0049) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0060)   
SIZE 0.0015* 0.0015* 0.0018* 0.0017* 0.0018* 0.0018* 0.0017* 0.0017*  
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)   
URBAN 0.0037 0.0037 0.0041 0.0041 0.0059** 0.0059** 0.0065*** 0.0065***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025)   
⊿BRANCH 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
ＬOAN/ASSET -0.0193* -0.0193* -0.0252** -0.0251** -0.0076 -0.0077 -0.0099 -0.0098   
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0118) (0.0118)   
Dummy [Year1928] -0.0037* -0.0037* -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0024 -0.0024   
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025)   
Dummy [Year1929] -0.0040** -0.0041** -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0004 -0.0004   
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023)   
INTERCEPT -0.0217 -0.0217 -0.0232 -0.0232 -0.0302* -0.0302* -0.0283 -0.0283   
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0190)   
Pho  -0.6082*** -0.6087*** -0.6336*** -0.6334***  
Observations 894 894 844 844 1075 1075 1075 1075   
Censored 181 181 231 231
R2/log likelihood  0.032 0.032 0.038 0.038 1561.0710 1561.1583 1318.4681 1318.4841   
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Appendix Table1  Interbank networks and contagious withdrawal of deposits (Selection model)
Dependent variable: Deposit Growth Rate
[1] [2] [3] [4]
NT 0.00556 0.0110                
(0.0144) (0.0144)                
NT*WA(GDEPO) 0.0112 0.0136                
(0.0104) (0.0105)                
NTN -0.00338 0.00183   
(0.0173) (0.0170)   
NTP 0.0191 0.0250   
(0.0163) (0.0163)   
M&A 0.0376 0.0458** 0.0375 0.0458** 
(0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0228)   
SIZE -0.0127* -0.0120 -0.0125* -0.0119   
(0.00716) (0.00735) (0.00717) (0.00734)   
ROE 0.284** 0.305** 0.286** 0.309** 
(0.126) (0.130) (0.127) (0.131)   
CAPDEPO 0.00105** 0.000893 0.00106*** 0.000902   
(0.000411) (0.000658) (0.000410) (0.000654)   
LIQUID -0.141 -0.0966 -0.145 -0.103   
(0.115) (0.126) (0.115) (0.126)   
SECURITY 0.0760*** 0.0640*** 0.0758*** 0.0640***
(0.0237) (0.0245) (0.0238) (0.0247)   
INTERCEPT 0.115 0.109 0.113 0.106   
(0.106) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109)   
Area dummies Yes No Yes No
rho 0.1155 -0.5832 0.1186 -0.5730
Log likelihood -310.4152 -319.8610 -310.0267 -319.5751
Censored 191 191 191 191
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007
Notes:
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*".
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 